Trochę chiński propagandowy post, ale jest kilka istotnych prawdziwych wątków - Chiny zdywersyfikowały sobie energetykę i z tego co sygnalizują, mają wyjebane co się dzieje na bliskim wschodzie - tj. obie opcje są dla nich ok (ormuz zamknięty lub otwarty) - bo ta wojna bardziej teraz uderza w Japonię, Koreę, Tajwan niż w nich i długoterminowo ustawia Chiny w lepszej pozycji.

Generalnie jak tak to czytam, to mam wrażenie że w Chinach są prawdziwi kwalifikowani rządzący a nie pacany trzymające stołki jak u nas, albo plecko-poklepywacze jak np. w Niemczech które próbują rządzić Europą (Niemcy działają w swoim własnym interesie względem reszty Europy - co dyskwalifikuje ich jako liderów EU).

🇨🇳📝Chinese Anon: It's highly likely that the Chinese leadership has fully calculated the political implications of this war.

Judging from their diplomatic stance in recent days, China initially demanded the opening of the Hormuz Strait, but has now shifted to a posturing approach of "promoting peace talks." In other words, whether the Strait is open or not is irrelevant to China: the shift is from "actively opening the Strait" to "accepting the status quo of blockade and benefiting from it."

China has a complete coal chemical industry system to replace petrochemicals under high oil prices. It also has a large new energy industry. Therefore, aside from the short-term impact, this war is beneficial to China in every dimension.

Looking back, China's energy strategy over the past decade seems almost like preparation for this moment. It's not that China foresaw this war, but rather that it has been systematically hedging against the scenario of "a one-day disruption of Middle Eastern oil supplies." Now that scenario has arrived.

Coal chemicals are the most undervalued asset. China has one of the world's largest coal reserves and has already built the world's most complete coal-to-oil, coal-to-olefins, and coal-to-natural gas industrial chains. Coal-to-oil projects by companies like Shenhua and China Coal were unprofitable when oil prices were $60, but profitable when prices were $80-90. The higher the oil price, the more economically viable the coal chemical industry becomes.

This means that the impact of high oil prices on China's chemical industry has a natural ceiling—when the cost of petrochemicals exceeds that of coal chemicals, China can switch to a coal-based route. Japan and South Korea do not have this option because they have neither coal reserves nor coal chemical production capacity.

The same logic applies to new energy. China controls over 80% of global photovoltaic production capacity, over 70% of lithium battery production capacity, and over 60% of wind power equipment production capacity. High oil prices do not damage China's new energy industry; rather, they provide it with a huge demand accelerator.

Every country will accelerate its energy transition in an environment of $90 oil prices, and almost all the equipment needed for this transition comes from China. China is both a hedge against and a beneficiary of high oil prices.

The same logic applies to the electric vehicle industry chain. BYD and CATL's global competitiveness has further widened in an environment of high oil prices. When American consumers pay $4-5 per gallon for gasoline, the economic justification for electric vehicles becomes irresistible. And China dominates the electric vehicle supply chain, from batteries to motors to complete vehicles.

Therefore, the net effect of high oil prices on the Chinese economy needs to be recalculated. The negative aspect is increased oil import costs. The positive aspects include: coal-to-chemicals substitution buffering petrochemical costs, accelerated exports of new energy equipment, a surge in global electric vehicle penetration, expanded RMB settlement, increased book value of strategic reserves (purchased at low prices, now at high prices), and increased channel value of discounted Russian oil. Adding these together, the net effect may approach zero or even be positive.

However, the net effect for Japan and South Korea is purely negative. They lack coal-to-chemicals substitution, their new energy industries are being crushed by China, their electric vehicle industries are being squeezed out by BYD, they lack deep strategic reserves, they lack alternative supply channels, and their currencies face devaluation pressure. The same oil price shock has completely opposite effects in China and Japan/South Korea.

Moreover, there is a longer-term implication. If the war and the strait blockade continue for 6-12 months, the global energy transition will be significantly accelerated. Who will be the biggest beneficiary of this acceleration? China.

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